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Abstract
We present a formal definition of anonymity in the context of concurrent processes. The definition 
is given in category theoretic terms. Moreover, the concept of a split cofibration is shown to both 
simplify the analysis of anonymity as well as to increase the framework’s expressiveness. Because 
of its categorical nature, our definition is largely independent of any specific model of concurrency. 
We instantiate the theory to two specific models, Hoare trace languages and probabilistic transition 
systems. By providing a semantics for CSP, the former model endows CSP with a definition of 
anonymity that applies to every CSP process simulation. The latter model, probabilistic transition 
systems, provides a definition of anonymity applicable to probabilistic processes. This seems to be 
the first general such definition.
Anonymity is a desirable feature for many 
kinds of transactions, including voting, pay­
ments, communications, and publishing. The 
existing research on anonymity is roughly clus­
tered along two axes. On the one hand, there 
is an extensive literature on security, including 
formal analyses of aspects of security such as 
integrity and secrecy. On the other, there is 
much work specific to anonymity, including in­
formal descriptions of useful anonymous systems 
and practical techniques for implementing them. 
However, the literature is relatively sparse at 
the intersection, leaving a gap where one would 
hope to have a richer body of theory specific to 
anonymity. In this report we present a contribu­
tion to filling this gap by giving a formal defini­
tion of anonymity applicable to a broad class of 
systems.
Most existing anonymous systems provide ser­
vices over computer networks. In the prototyp­
ical example, a system allows Alice to transmit 
a message to Bob across a network without it 
being apparent that she has done so, even to an 
attacker who monitors all network traffic. How­
ever, it is useful to view the concept of anonymity 
in a broader context. For instance, a local voting 
system, without any networked communication, 
may still require a form of anonymity, namely un- 
linkability between voter and vote. Indeed, even 
in a network communications system, there are 
a number of distinct senses of anonymity; Pfitz- 
mann and Waidner [PW87] distinguish sender 
anonymity, receiver anonymity, and unlinkability 
between sender and receiver. On a deeper level, 
any concept of anonymity confined to a network­
ing model will inevitably run up against artificial 
limitations.
In this report, we consider anonymity within 
the general context of concurrency. Accordingly, 
we view an anonymous system as a process, a 
system built out of concurrently interacting en­
tities. In casting our definition in terms of pro­
cesses, we are able to reap the rewards of several 
decades of research on concurrency. For example, 
process algebras such as CSP and the 7r-calculus 
are Turing complete, so they are able to model 
any computationally meaningful system, and are 
amenable to formal analysis. At the same time,
I. Introduction these algebras are well suited to intuitive, high- 
level specifications of real systems and directly 
model fundamental concepts such as nondeter­
minism and concurrency. Moreover, extensions 
of these traditional process algebras can express 
behavior such as probabilistic choice, priority, 
time, traffic patterns, etc., opening the way to 
increasingly expressive definitions of anonymity. 
For instance, we show in section V how to apply 
our definition to a probabilistic model of concur­
rency. In fact, ours seems to be the first defini­
tion of anonymity capable of handling probabil­
ity.
A large number of models of concurrency have 
been proposed. Our approach is largely indepen­
dent of any specific model and seems to apply to 
many of the models in common use. This gener­
ality is achieved by formulating the definition in 
category theoretic terms. At this level of abstrac­
tion, the idea of anonymity becomes very simple; 
it is simply the set of symmetries of a simulation 
between processes: k : System -»■ Screen. The 
two related processes are the anonymous system 
itself, System, and an attacker’s knowledge of it, 
Screen. This latter knowledge is modeled as a 
second system that evolves in parallel with the 
original system (but which usually has a coarser 
set of states). Intuitively, the simulation k drives 
Screen.
In conformity with Kerckhoffs’ principle, the 
attacker is assumed to have full knowledge of 
the specification and implementation of System, 
Screen, and k, but is only granted direct knowl­
edge of the state of Screen, not that of System. 
Because all deductions the attacker makes about 
the state of System are dependent on k, con­
straints on k place constraints on the attacker’s 
knowledge, regardless of the attacker’s inference 
system. In particular, the requirement of sym­
metry guarantees that it is only possible for an 
attacker to make general deductions about all in­
dividuals equated by symmetries. It is impossi­
ble to make any deduction that singles out one 
such individual from others. This is the essence 
of anonymity.
The set of symmetries of the knowledge simu­
lation k is called the anonymity monoid. (In con­
trast to most contexts in which symmetry is used, 
we do not require our symmetries to be invertible 
because there are some contexts in which nonin-
vertible symmetries are meaningful.) Depending 
on the desired anonymity requirements of a sys­
tem, the structure demanded may vary. Roughly 
speaking, the larger the anonymity monoid, the 
greater the guaranteed anonymity of the system, 
but the structure of the anonymity monoid car­
ries finer information. For instance, a voting sys­
tem might demand symmetry between all vot­
ers. In other words the anonymity monoid is re­
quired to contain the full symmetric group on 
the set of voting events. However, suppose that 
the voters are divided into parties Pi and P2 and 
we demand symmetry between members within 
a party but not between parties. In other words, 
an attacker may be able to distinguish votes orig­
inating in Pi from those originating in P2, but 
cannot distinguish individual votes within those 
groups. This requirement demands a certain sub­
set of the full symmetric group. Suppose, for 
another example, that a voting system only ex­
hibits symmetry with respect to a cyclic group of 
permutations around a cyclic ordering. This pro­
vides a much weaker notion of anonymity, since 
it allows for an attacker to deduce the distance 
between the positions of two voters in the cyclic 
ordering. Evidently, these are only two of many 
possible variations, corresponding to the many 
kinds of anonymity which a voting system may 
require.
We are aware of two prior contributions1 to 
the problem of formalizing anonymity, [SS96] 
and [SS99]. Of these, the paper by Schneider 
and Sidiropoulos [SS96] is more directly relevant 
to our approach and was in fact one of our in­
spirations. However, that work had a number of 
limitations. First, being set within the language 
of Hoare’s CSP process algebra [Hoa85], it was 
bound to a single process algebra and inherited 
that algebra’s expressive limitations. In particu­
lar, CSP cannot express probabilistic behavior, a 
serious limitation in modeling anonymity. For in­
stance, the analysis in [SS96] will count as anony­
mous a system in which, say, the publisher of a 
document can always be determined with a prob­
ability of 99%, but never with absolute certainty.
*A th ird  pap er has recently come to  our 
a tten tion : V italy  Shm atikov, Dom inic J.D . 
Hughes, Defining A nonym ity and Privacy. See 
h ttp ://w w w .d si.u n iv e .it/IF IP W G l_ 7 / 
W IT S 2002 /p rog /anno ta ted_program .h tm l
Another limitation is that their system cannot 
handle the anonymity of dependent events, such 
as the voting events in a system in which each 
voter can vote at most once. Another formal 
approach to anonymity, based on logic, was pro­
posed in [SS99]. It is largely complementary to 
our own approach. However, like [SS96], it is 
possibilistic rather than probabilistic.
II. A G eneral Fram ew o r k  for 
A nonymity
Our formalization of anonymity is set in the 
general context of concurrent processes. We will 
first describe its ingredients in broad terms. As 
was indicated in the introduction, anonymity 
is a function of both a system and an at­
tacker’s knowledge of that system. The sys­
tem is modeled as a process System and the at­
tacker’s knowledge is modeled as a simulation 
k : System —> Screen. For this we require a model
V of concurrent processes which includes a notion 
of simulation. Many such models have been stud­
ied: Petri nets, labelled transition systems, pom- 
sets, etc. We also require a notion of the elements 
of a process. Roughly speaking, the elements of a 
process are the individuals or, more precisely, the 
specific actions, whose anonymity is under con­
sideration. In order to bring elements into our 
framework we need both a model M  for them as 
well as a function a :V  -»■ M  which associates 
elements a(P) to each process P. For example, if 
we base our model V of processes on CCS [Mil89], 
then we could take the elements of a process to be 
its alphabet of actions. Technically, the study of 
anonymity is greatly simplified when a is a split 
cofibration. Very roughly, this means that any 
simulation of processes S -»■ T induces a map­
ping a(S) -»■ a(T) on underlying elements, and 
conversely transforming the underlying elements 
of a process induces a new process simulating the 
original process. For instance, transforming the 
alphabet of a CCS process induces a new process 
by renaming.
Because of the proliferation of models of con­
currency, it is advantageous to work at a higher 
level of abstraction. Following a line of research 
expounded in [WN95], we will view a model of 
concurrency as a category. In this framework, 
the objects of the category correspond to pro­
cesses, the morphisms to simulations, and the ba­
sic constructions of concurrency theory appear as 
basic category theoretic structures appropriately 
interpreted. Further, the relationships between 
different models of concurrency typically appear 
as adjunctions.
Let us introduce some basic category theoretic 
notation and terminology. Let C be a category, 
which for convenience we will assume is locally 
small. If A and B are objects of C, denote by 
IUmi(,4.B) the hom set of morphisms from A to 
/>’. If /  G Hum(.4. />’). then we say that A is the 
source of /  and B is the target of /. For any 
object A, the hom set IUmi(,4.,4) is a monoid 
which we denote End(^4).
Let V be a category corresponding to some 
notion of process. We will call V the process 
category. Let k : S ^  N  be a morphism in V. 
We will call S the system, N  the screen, and k 
the knowledge morphism.
Definition II. 1 A symmetry of k : S —»■ N  is
an element r G End(S) satisfying k ° r  =  k.
A symmetry of k is a transformation of the sys­
tem S that leaves k unchanged. Intuitively, it 
is a transformation that k cannot detect, hence 
it is an anonymous transformation. Because we 
haven’t yet introduced the elements of a process 
into the framework, this definition is more ab­
stract than we’ll typically want to apply in prac­
tice. We therefore defer further discussion until 
after fleshing out the framework with a fibering 
over a category of elements.
A. Anonymity in Cofibrations
In the category theoretic interpretation of con­
currency, fibrations and cofihrations play an in­
teresting role related to what we called above the 
elements of a process. Depending on the specific 
model, the elements of a process represent vari­
ously events, actions, names, ports, communica­
tion channels, locations, etc. On a simple level, 
extracting the elements of a process just amounts 
to a forgetful functor a :V  -»■ B, where B is typ­
ically a category of relatively unstructured ob­
jects, such as sets. However, in many interest­
ing models, cocartesian liftings of morphisms in 
B correspond to relabelling operations for pro­
cesses, while cartesian liftings correspond to re­
striction operations. In many models of concur­
rency, such liftings generally exist, supplying the 
functor a with fibration and cofibration struc­
tures. Only relabelling operations will play a role 
in this paper, so we will only need cocartesian 
liftings and cofibrations. What we need of these 
concepts is very briefly recalled in appendix A.
Let V be a category corresponding to some no­
tion of process, with a split cofibration a :V  -»■ B 
with splitting k. We call B the category of ele­
ments.
Before stating the main definition, we need a 
bit of notation. Let S be an object of V as above 
and let E =  a(S). Denote by Enda (E) the sub­
monoid of End(E) consisting of all h G End(E) 
for which h»(S) =  S. Denote by Enda(S) 
the submonoid of End(S) consisting of all r G 
End(S) for which a(r) G Enda(,E). Note that 
we have a pair of monoid homomorphisms
Enda(E) Enda(S) -* Enda(E) (II. 1)
The first is given by h ^  n(h,S), while the sec­
ond is given by r >->■ a(r). Because their compos­
ite is the identity, it follows that the first is an 
injection and the second is a surjection. In par­
ticular, Enda (E) is identified with a submonoid 
of End(S).
Definition II.2 Let E =  a(S) be the elements 
of S. The anonymity monoid Anon(k) =  
Anona(k) of k : S —»■ N  is the submonoid of 
Enda(E) consisting of all h G Enda{E) satisfy­
ing k o n(h, S) = k.
Remarks:
1. The intuitive justification for this definition 
is as follows. By Kerckhoffs’ assumption, an 
attacker has complete knowledge of S, N, and 
k. This knowledge together with observations of 
the state of N  is the basis for anything the 
attacker may deduce about the state of S. If 
k =  k o n(h, S), then the same deductions must 
apply after the system has been transformed by 
h, so these deductions cannot discriminate 
among elements equated by h. One may even 
think of the deduction itself as transforming by 
h. For instance, if an anonymous 
transformation h exchanges elements a and b, 
then any deduction about a available to the 
attacker must equally well apply to b and vice
versa. All elements thus equated have 
“dissolved into a crowd.”
It should be emphasized that anonymity and 
secrecy are distinct notions. Anonymity within 
a group does not preclude deductions about its 
members. Indeed, this would defy common 
sense. What it does preclude is making 
deductions about individuals that do not apply 
to all members of the group equally. For 
example, suppose that it is apparent in a voting 
system that a vote has been unanimous. In this 
case, an attacker can obviously deduce every 
voter’s choice (the same choice). From a 
non-unanimous vote, the attacker can deduce 
nothing about the vote of any individual voter. 
While the two concepts have an affinity, it is an 
advantage to be able both to isolate them and 
to experiment with their interactions, as is 
possible in our framework.
2. Anonymity in the context of split 
cofibrations admits a great simplification from 
the general case. First, by lemma A.4, the 
knowledge morphism k factors uniquely as
k =  u' o «(/, S ) where /  = a(k). Now suppose 
that h 6 Enda (E). Then h G Anon(k) exactly 
when the following sequence of equivalent 
equations hold:
k =  k o n(h,P) 
u' o «(/, S) =  u' o «(/, S ) o k(Ji, P ) 
u' o « ( / ,  S) =  u' o  « ( /  o  h, S)
f = f °h
It follows that the vertical part u' of k has no 
bearing on anonymity, so only relabelling 
operations are relevant to anonymity in split 
cofibrations. Moreover, the symmetry equation 
k =  k o k(Ii , P ) collapses to the equation 
/  = /  o h in the base category B, which can be 
expected to be much simpler than the process 
category. We summarize these facts in the 
following proposition.
Proposition II.3Let f  =  a(k). Then 
Anon(k) =  Anoninif, S)). Moreover, if 
h G Enda (E), then h G Anon(k) exactly when 
f = f°h.
3. For any category V , the identity functor 
id : V -»■ V is a split cofibration. In this
situation, the anonymity monoid Anonid(k) is 
the submonoid of End(S) consisting of those 
h 6 End(S) for which k o h = k. This is the 
universal situation, in the sense that every other 
cofibration factors through this one trivially, 
and there are natural monoid homomorphisms
Anona(k) ^  Anonid(k) -» Anona(k) (H-2)
obtained from II. 1.
4. Suppose k is the identity morphism
k : S -»■ S. This amounts to saying that the 
attacker has complete knowledge of the system. 
In this case, Anon(k) is the trivial monoid. 
Indeed, this is clear if a =  id and from this the 
general case follows by II.2. The same 
conclusion holds if k is a monomorphism. 
Consequently, there is no anonymity if the 
attacker has complete knowledge.
5. Suppose Ms a terminal object of V (roughly 
speaking, a process that does nothing), and k is 
the unique morphism k : S —»■ t. This amounts 
to saying that the attacker has no knowledge at 
all. In this situation, every transformation of S 
is anonymous: k o n(h, S) =  k is automatic, 
there being only one morphism to t. 
Consequently, there is complete anonymity if 
the attacker has no knowledge.
6. It is intuitively clear that the greater the 
attacker’s knowledge, the less the anonymity. 
The previous two remarks illustrate the extreme 
positions on this spectrum. Suppose now that
k : S N factors as
k
S - N' ' Nk v
This amounts to saying that k' carries more 
information than k. Here, we view S as fixed, 
but the attacker’s knowledge as varying. In this 
case, we have an injection Anon(k') ^  Anon(k), 
so the anonymity does indeed decrease with k’.
7. Suppose again that k : S -»■ N  factors, but 




to emphasize this viewpoint. Here, the attacker 
can deduce more information about S' than
about S. However, a comparison between 
Anon(k') and Anon(k) is complicated by the 
fact that these two live in different places, 
namely Enda(i?') and Enda(E). In general, 
there is no natural map between these in either 
direction, but there is a relation 
R =  End„(/) C Enda(£7) x End„(£;') defined 
as follows. Write E =  a(S) and E' =  a(S') and 
let /  : E  -»■ E' be /  = a(u). Then R =
(0h, h') G Enda(£7) x Enda(i?') : h! o f  =  f  o h}.
This relation is in fact a monoid relation, which 
means by definition that
1.(1,1) G R
2.(hi,h[), (h2,h'2) G R = >  (hih2,h'1h'2) G R 
If /  is monomorphic, this relation is a partial 
function from Enda(i?') to Enda (E) while if it 
is an epimorphism it is a partial function from 
Enda (E) to Enda {E').
By proposition II.3, there is no loss of generality 
in assuming that u =  k(J, S), from which it 
follows that S' =  /* (S). For instance, if V is 
some semantics of a process algebra such as 
CCS, then S' could be the result of renaming or 
hiding events in S.
Lemma IIASuppose u =  «(/, S). Then 
R(Anon(k')) C Anon(k).
Proof: Let h G R(Anon(k')). Then there 
is some h' G Anon(k') for which (h,h') G R. By 
definition, h! o /  = /  o h, and h»(S) =  S. We 
have
k o n(h, S) = k' o k(/, S) o n(h, S)
= k' o n(f o h, S)
=  k'o K(h' o /, S)
= k' o K(h ',S ')oK(f, S )
= k' o K(J, S)
=  k
Corollary H.SSuppose u =  n(f, S ) with f  
epimorphic. If (h,h') G End„(/) then 
h G Anon(k) if and only if h! G Anon(k').
Proof: This follows from the lemma, 
because if /  is epimorphic, then J? is a partial 
function from Enda(i?) to Enda(i?'). ■
By the above lemma, identifying an anonymous 
transformation in the narrowed system S' can 
determine anonymous transformations in the 
system S. This can be useful for simplifying 
computations. A typical use would be in 
analyzing a process with an alphabet E for 
which we are primarily concerned about 
anonymity among a subset A C E .  Rather than 
directly studying the anonymity of k, which 
may involve unwanted complications, we could 
study that of the k' corresponding to an /  
which hides all events of E \ A.
8. In the context of anonymity, the distinction 
between cofibration and the dual notion of 
fibration is significant. While cocartesian 
liftings express relabellings, which relate to 
observation of a system, cartesian liftings 
express restrictions, which relate to controlling a 
system. We hope to incorporate fibrations into 
a more comprehensive theory of active attacks, 
involving both knowledge and interactions.
III. H oare  T race Languages as a 
Cofibered Category
In this section we will recall a simple and fa­
miliar model of concurrency called Hoare trace 
languages. In order to fit it into our frame­
work, we review how it can be given the struc­
ture of a cofibered category. This model can 
provide semantics for Hoare’s CSP process alge­
bra. This section therefore provides definitions of 
anonymity applicable to every system specified in 
CSP. In the following section, we will illustrate 
this with explicit CSP examples.
If ,4 is a set, denote by A* the set of all fi­
nite strings of elements of A. If s and t are two 
strings, denote their concatenation by st. A pre­
fix of a string u is a string s for which u =  st 
for some string t. A set of strings is called pre­
fix closed if it contains every prefix of each of its 
elements.
Definition II I .l  A  Hoare trace language (H T L )
is a pair (S, A) in which A is a set called the al­
phabet and S is a prefix closed subset S C A* ■
HTLs can serve as a model concurrency. The al­
phabet consists of the actions or events in which 
a process can participate, and the set S of strings 
is the set of possible initial sequences of events 
encountered as the process executes.
The set of HTLs with a fixed alphabet A  is 
partially ordered by inclusion. We may view 
this partial order as a category. This structure 
is meaningful in terms of process behavior. If 
S c r c i ,  then (T, A) is capable of simulating 
(S,A) -  in other words, (T,A) can do anything 
(S, A) can do.
There is a more general notion of simulation 
for HTLs. Note that a function f  : A  -»■ B in­
duces a function /* : A* -»■ B* by substitution: 
f* (ai •••«„) = f(o.i) ■ ■ ■ f ( a n). Henceforth, we 
will drop the superscript and write /  for /*. De­
fine a simulation of an HTL (S, A) by (T, B) to 
be a function /  : A  -»■ B for which f(S) C T .
We can define a category HTL in which the 
objects are HTLs and the morphisms are simu­
lations. This category admits a split cofibration 
(a, k) over the category Sets of sets. Here a is the 
forgetful functor a : HTL —?■ Sets which maps an 
object (S, A) to its underlying alphabet A, and 
maps a morphism (S, A) -»■ (T, B) to its under­
lying function /  : A  -»■ B. The splitting k is 
given as follows. If /  : A  -»■ B is a function, and 
(S,A) is an HTL, then n(f,(S,A)) is the simu­
lation given by /  from (S', A) to (f (S ) ,B ).
We can now state a definition of anonymity for 
processes modeled by HTL.
Definition III.2 (Anonymity for HTLs) Let
k : (S, A) —> (T, B) be the morphism of HTL de­
termined by a function K  : A  —»■ B. Then a 
function H : A —»■ A is in Anon(k) when
1. H(S) =  S
2. K  o i l  — K
Of course, this definition is nothing but defini­
tion II.2 stated explicitly for HTL.
Here, the fibration is over Sets, but we have 
freedom to use other base categories. One possi­
bility is the category of partial functions, i.e. the 
category whose objects are sets and whose mor­
phisms are partial functions. It is also sometimes 
convenient to allow arbitrary relations between
sets. Note that while partial functions may be 
considered as relations, they do not behave as 
relations in models of concurrency. The cate­
gory HTL can be enlarged so that it fibers over 
relations, or over partial functions, but these en­
compass distinct kinds of expressiveness. If /  is 
a partial function, and /(a) is undefined, then 
f(s) erases occurrences of a. On the other hand, 
if the partial function were interpreted as a rela­
tion, and /(a) is undefined, then f(s) is empty 
whenever a occurs in s. We can interpret the 
partial function behavior to mean that /  is re­
ally a monoid homomorphism A* -»■ B* specified 
on the generators A. Hence, /(a) undefined re­
ally means /(a) = 1.
To generalize both partial functions and rela­
tions at once, we can use the category of monoid 
relations. To be precise, this is the category 
whose objects are sets and in which a morphism 
A  -»■ B is specified by giving a monoid relation 
(see section II, remark 7) R C A* x B*. A rela­
tion R is considered to be a monoid relation by 
equating it with the monoid relation R* it gener­
ates under the inclusion R C  A x  B C A* xB*. A 
partial function /  is considered to be the monoid 
relation generated by {(a,/(a)) : /(a) defined}U 
{(a, 1) : /(a) undefined}. Then HTL can be en­
larged in a way that it admits a split cofibration 
over the category of monoid relations. For this, 
we take a morphism (S, A) -»■ (T, B) to be spec­
ified by a monoid relation R C A* x B* satisfy­
ing the same condition as for functions, namely 
R(S ) C  T. The splitting is also described exactly 
as before: if R C A* x B* is a monoid relation 
and (S,A) is an HTL, then n (f ,(S ,A )) is the 
simulation given by R from (S,A) to (R(S),B).
The expressiveness of the category of monoid 
relations comes at a price. In computational 
terms, some morphisms in this category are un­
wieldy to specify, even for small label sets. In 
terms of our view of processes, monoid relations 
‘violate’ the granularity of actions by relating se­
quences of actions of different lengths, which may 
or may not be appropriate for a given applica­
tion. The question of which category to fiber 
over is a matter of context and judgment.
To restate the definition for anonymity for 
HTLs for the enlarged category fibered over 
monoid relations requires only that we replace 
the word ‘function’ with the phrase ‘monoid re-
lation’ in definition III.2. Finally, the entire voting system is
IV. A Simple V oting  E xample  in CSP
In this section we present a simple vot­
ing example as a CSP process and analyze it 
for anonymity. The basic reference for CSP 
is [Hoa85], while [Ros98] also covers many sub­
sequent developments. The reader may wish to 
compare the analysis in this section with [SS96].
The voting system will have N  voters, Vi, V2, 
Vjv, each of whom casts either a yes or a no 
vote, and then stops. In this example, we treat 
the yes or no choice as nondeterminism. If we 
denote by vote.k.yes the event of V* casting a 
vote of yes, and similarly for a vote of no, the 
definition of V* is
Vk =  (vote.k.yes —> S T O P )n (v o te .k .n o  —> S T O P )
Recall that in CSP the symbol FI denotes nonde- 
terministic choice. The ensemble Voters^  of all 
the voters is simply the V  acting concurrently. 
Recalling that in CSP the symbol | denotes con­
currency, we have
VotersN =  Vi || V2 || • • • || V v  
The alphabet of events for this process is the set
V =  {vote.k.v  : k  € { 1, 2, . . . ,  N } ,  v G {yes, no }}
We will represent a tally of y yes votes and n 
no votes as Tallyy n . We view Tally yn as a de­
terministic process that first announces its tally 
with an event tally.y.n  and thereafter responds 
to any voting event vote.k.v by becoming a new 
tally, appropriately incremented. More precisely,
Tallyy n  =  tally.y.n  —> Tally'y n ,
where Tallyy n responds to vote.k.yes for any k  by 
becoming Tallyy+l n, and responds to vote.k.no  
by becoming Tallyy n+l. In CSP, this may be 
denoted
Tally'y n =  x  : V  —> P ( x )
=  (  T d ,v ^  itl’ =  !/“
I Tallyy n+1 if v =  no
where
VotingN =  VotersN || Tally0 0
Let us pause to be more precise about the al­
phabets of these processes. The tally events that 
are required by VotingN are all the tally.y.n for 
which y and n are nonnegative integers satisfying 
y + n < N. Denote the set of such events
T  =  {tally.y.n : y ,n  G N, j/ + n < N }
Then we take VotingN and all the Tallyy n pro­
cesses to have alphabet V U T. Note that be­
cause the alphabet of Voters^ is disjoint from 
T, Votersn does not synchronize on tally events.
We now define the attacker’s knowledge as a 
CSP process. Clearly, if the attacker can see the 
events vote.k.v, there can be no anonymity. On 
the other hand, it is intuitively clear that if these 
events are not visible, the voters are anonymous. 
Thus, we define
Screen^ = VotingN \  V
Recall that in CSP the symbol \ denotes con­
cealment, so ScreenN indeed represents VotingN 
with all voting events removed.
A more liberal choice for the attacker’s knowl­
edge would be to replace each voting event 
vote.k.v with an event vote.v stripped of the 
reference to the voter. This can be indicated 
in CSP using change of symbols. Let V' = 
{vote.yes, vote.no} and define the function /  :
V -»■ V' by / (vote.k.v) =  vote.v. Then we set
Screen'N =  f(VotingN)
Now, to analyze the anonymity of this system, 
we employ the traces semantics of CSP, with 
target in the Hoare trace languages. Thus, in­
terpreting definition II. 2 and applying proposi­
tion II.3, anonymity in CSP can be summarized 
as follows.
Definition IV. 1 Given a CSP process System 
with alphabet A, and a simulation k : System —> 
Screen, the anonymity monoid is the set of rela­
tions R : A  —»■ A for which R(System) =  System 
and ko R =  k.
When we apply this definition to the sim­
ulation VotingN —> Screenjv we find that the
transposition of every pair of voters is in the 
anonymity monoid. More precisely, for ev­
ery i , j  6 {1.2......A’}. the transpositions of
voted.yes with vote.j.yes and voted.no with 
vote.j.no are in the anonymity monoid. Rather 
than present the easy proof, we will merely 
illustrate how one particular trace is trans­
formed by a transposition. Take N  =  4 and 
let R be the transposition of voters 1 and
2. For example, tally.0.0, voteA.no, tally.0.1, 
vote.l.yes, tally. 1.1, vote.2.yes, tally.2.1 is a valid 
trace of Voting4. Applying R to it yields: 
tally.0.0, voteA.no, tally.0.1, vote.2.yes, tally. 1.1, 
vote.l.yes, tally.2.1. Now, this is certainly differ­
ent from the original trace, but after we apply the 
simulation by Screen4, the difference disappears; 
both traces become tally.0.0, tally.0.1, tally. 1.1, 
tally.2.1. Similarly, if we apply the simulation by 
Screen^ , both traces become tally.0.0, vote.no, 
tally.0.1, vote.yes, tally. 1.1, vote.yes, tally.2.1. 
Moreover, since every permutation can be ob­
tained as a succession of transpositions, this im­
plies that every permutation of the voters is also 
in the anonymity monoid. This confirms our ex­
pectation that in the voting, all voters are dis­
tinct, but indistinguishable, to the attacker.
Remark IV.2 The definition of anonymity 
in [SS96] fits into our framework as follows. 
The abstraction of events in that paper plays 
the role of the knowledge relation k. There 
are three basic kinds of abstraction: hiding, re­
naming, and masking. Within the category of 
monoid relations, all three can be represented 
as k(J,P) for some suitable monoid relation f .  
Let P  denote a CSP process and let ABS de­
note some composition of abstractions. Let A 
be a set of events and let Iia  be the hiding re­
lation on A, that maps all elements of A to 1 
and leaves other elements unchanged. Then the 
definition of Schneider-Sidiropoulos anonymity 
of P  with respect to the set of events A is 
hA^{hA{ABS{P))) =  ABS(P).
Proposition IV.3 With notation as above, P  
satisfies Schneider-Sidiropoulos anonymity if and 
only if the anonymity monoid of Iia  on ABS(P) 
contains h-A^1 0 ha-
V. A P robabilistic M odel of 
C oncurrency
In order to show that probability is within the 
scope of our framework, we need an appropri­
ate category theoretic account of a probabilistic 
model of concurrency. An important such model 
is probabilistic transition systems. This model is 
a probabilistic generalization of the familiar la­
belled transition systems, but where an action 
leads from a given state to a probability distri­
bution of states. This model also incorporates 
pure nondeterminism, in that multiple distribu­
tions may be associated with the same action at 
the same state.
Probabilistic transition systems are very con­
venient as a target of the semantics of proba­
bilistic process algebras. For instance, [JLY01] 
presents an elegant procedure for extending es­
sentially any non-probabilistic process algebra by 
introducing a probabilistic internal choice opera­
tor. The semantics of this extended algebra is in 
terms of probabilistic transition systems. In view 
of this, the account we give here of probabilistic 
transition systems automatically endows a large 
class of probabilistic process algebras with a def­
inition of anonymity.
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that 
all probability spaces X  are countable and dis­
crete, so that probability distributions can be 
represented as functions p : X  -»■ [0,1] satisfy­
ing YhxexP(x)- Denote by Dist(X) the set of all 
probability distributions on X.
Definition V.l A probabilistic transition sys­
tem (PTS) is a quadruple (T,,L,T,H) where
1. E is a nonempty finite set of states
2. L is a set of actions
3. T C S x L x  Dist(E) is the transition relation 
4• tto 6 Dist(E) is the initial distribution
We have adopted this definition from [JLY01]. 
Numerous variants of this definition have ap­
peared in the literature, dating all the way back 
to Rabin’s probabilistic automata [Rab63], a de­
terministic variant which specifies a set of final 
states.
The interpretation of the PTS structure is as 
follows. The system initially assumes a state 
probabilistically based on the initial distribution. 
Suppose (s,a, 7Ti) 6 T . Then the action a can
cause a transition from state s to another state 
of E according to the probability distribution tt. 
A suggestive notation for the transition relation 
is to write * <r. or simply s —> tt, when
(s,a,ir) G T.
There may be multiple transitions (s,a, 7Ti), 
(s, a, tt2 ) ,  . . .  G T emanating from the same state 
s for the same action a. In this case, when 
the system is in state s, and action a is per­
formed, the choice among the transition distri­
butions 7Ti, 7T2,... is nondeterministic.
A simulation P between PTS’s S =  
(E. / , . /T,,) and S' = (E'. L'.T'. /r',) is a pair 
P =  (/> h) where h : L ->■ V  and /  : E ->■ E' are 
functions satisfying
/*"?To =  7T0
and
a __, \ Ma). ^
S —)• 7T =>■ /(S) --► /*7T.
We can generalize /  to be a general relation 
from E to E'. In [LS91], a definition is given of 
probabilistic bisimulation between deterministic 
probabilistic transition systems involving a rela­
tion on states. This definition has been widely 
adopted and it carries over to the case at hand. 
For this we need to recall a definition which first 
appeared in [JL91], indicating how a relation be­
tween sets induces a relation between probability 
distributions on those sets.
Definition V.2 Let R C X  x Y  be a relation.
Define the induced relation R* C Dist(X) x 
Dist(y) as follows. A pair (p,q) is in R* ex­
actly when there is a distribution W (x ,y) on 
X  x Y  for which p(x) = Y v^^r(x) W{x,y) and 
q{x) =  J2X£R(y) W{x,y) and W(x,y) =  0 unless 
(x,y) G R.
Definition V.3 A simulation P between PTS’s 
S =  (E,L, T ,7r0) and S' = (E',L',T',7rg) is a 
pair P =  (/, h) where h : V  —»■ L is a function 
and f  : E —»■ E' is a relation on states such that
1. TTq G /*7T0
2. Whenever s A  tt is a transition in S and s' G 
f(s), then there is a transition s' h a^\  in S'.
It is straight forward to define a category PTS 
in which the objects are PTS’s and the mor­
phisms are simulations. For instance, composi­
tion is defined ( f i ,h i)o (f2,h2) =  ( f io f2,hioh2). 
We omit the verification that this composition 
determines a simulation and satisfies the condi­
tions required of the morphisms of a category.
There is a forgetful functor a : PTS -»■ Sets 
defined:
1. for an object S = (E,L ,T, 7r0) of PTS, a(S) = 
L
2. for a morphism f3 =  (f ,h ), a(j3) =  h.
Let S = (E. L. l \  /Tu) be a PTS and let h : 
L' ^  L be a function. Then we define the push- 
forward PTS to be ft*S = (E,L',T',7To) where 
T' is defined to be the collection of all transitions 
(s,h(a),ir) for which (s,a,tt) G T.
There is a natural simulation S -»■ ft*S given 
by P =  (1 ,h), lifting the morphism h in Sets.
Proposition V.4 The morphism f3 : S —»■ h„S 
is cocartesian.
Proof: Suppose S" = (E",L",T",7rg) and 
P" : S -»• S" is a morphism with 0" =  (/", h'oh). 
We must show that there is a unique morphism 
P' : h*S -»■ S" for which P" = P' o p and 
a(P') =  h!. By the second condition, P' =  (g,h ') 
for some relation g. The first condition states 
that (f",h' o h) = (g,h!) o (l,h) =  (g,h' o h). 
Therefore, P' =  (/", h!) is the only possible mor­
phism satisfying the conditions. To check that it 
is indeed a morphism, note first that ttq G / 'V 0 
because this same condition is required of P".
Next, suppose that s h a^\  tt in h*S correspond­
ing to a transition s A  tt in S, and let s" G /"(«). 
Then because P" is a morphism, there is some
transition s" h'{h{a)\  in S" with tt' G /> .  
This verifies the second condition. ■
Proposition V.5 For a function h : L' —»■ L 
of sets, and a PTS S with set of actions L, set 
n(h,S) =  (l,h) : S —> h„S. Then (a ,n ) is a split 
cofibration of PTS over Sets.
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A p p e n d i x
I .  C O FIBRA TIO N S
Let a : V -»■ B be a functor. We will say that 
an object S of V lies over an object A of B if 
a(S) =  A. Similarly, a morphism u of V lies over 
a morphism /  of B if a(u) =  f .  If A is an object 
of B, the fiber (of a) over A is the subcategory 
of V consisting of all objects of V lying over A 
and all morphisms of V lying over id^ - Clearly, 
every object S of V is in a unique fiber, namely 
the fiber over a(S). Denote the fiber over A by 
a-HA).
Definition A.l Let f  : A —»■ A' be a morphism 
in B. A cocartesian lifting of f  is a morphism u : 
P  —> P' ofV  lying over f  and satisfying the fol­
lowing universal condition: for every morphism 
u" : P  —> P" for which a(u") =  f  o f  for some 
f , there is a unique morphism u' : P' —> P" for 
which u" =  u' o u.
Definition A .2 The functor a is an cofibration 
if for every morphism f  : A —»■ A' in B and for 
every object P  lying over A, there is a cocartesian 
lifting u : P  ->■ P' of f .
We now recall the more rigid concept of a split 
cofibration, which is all that we use in the paper.
A lifting for a functor a : V -»■ B is a func­
tion that specifies a morphism «(/, S) of V lying 
over a given morphism f  of B and with specified 
source S (necessarily lying over the source of /). 
In other words, for each morphism /  : A -»■ A' of
B, and each object P  lying over A, there is given 
a morphism «(/, P) of V satisfying a(«(/, P)) =  
f . Let us say that a lifting k is a splitting if it 
satisfies the following properties:
1. K(idA,P) = idp for all objects A of B and 
objects P  lying over A
2. n(g o f , P )  =  n (g ,P ')  o « ( / ,  P), where P' is 
the target of k(/,P).
Definition A .3 The pair (a ,n ) is a split cofi­
bration if and only if each morphism k(J, P) is a 
cocartesian lifting of f .
Lemma A .4 Let n be a splitting of a. The pair 
(■a,K) is a split cofibration if every morphism u : 
P  —> P' o fV  factors uniquely as
u =  u' o n(a(u),P) 
for some morphism u' in the same fiber as P' .
We omit the proof.
If (a, k) is a split cofibration, then every mor­
phism /  : A -»■ A' in B induces a functor 
/* : o r 1 (A) -»■ o r 1 (A1) as follows. On ob­
jects, /*(P) is the target of «(/, P). Now sup­
pose u : P  -»■ P' is a morphism in o r 1 (A). 
Then the morphism «(/, P') o u lies over /. By 
the lemma, this morphism can be uniquely ex­
pressed as k(/, P') o u =  u' o k(/, P). We define 
/*(«) = u'.
p ^ U P )
p ' ^ ' u n
The above rather streamlined account suffices 
for our purposes. See [Ben85] for more details.
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